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Abstract—Dynamic run-time selection and sourcing of ser-
vice components provide considerable potential in todays
changing business world. They provide means to counter
agility, flexibility and the ability to integrate applications
originating from systems of different security domains. While
the advantages are obvious strong implications to security in
general and authorizatin and access control in particular do
exist. In this paper we present an infrastructure-based ap-
proach for en-route dynamic credential enrichment. It enables
dynamic replacement of access-restricted service instances
by implementing runtime supplementation of security tokens.
If authorized, a security intermediary accesses user profiles
and retrieves security tokens supplied by identity providers
and needed for access control at dynamically selected access-
restricted service instances.
Keywords-Dynamic Service Selection, Service Access Control,
Mediated Access Control;
I. INTRODUCTION
While organizations have for decades been rewarded for
consolidating around standard processes and for stockpil-
ing assets, nowadays flexibility on operation and service
allocation is becoming a key differentiator. Operations are
no longer assumed to be confined within organizational
boundaries but more and more often involve short-term
collaboration with frequently changing external partners in a
broader ecosystem. Smart business networks and other forms
of short-term collaboration promise to allow for “rapidly
pick, plug, and play” [1] business processes and services
accross companies’ borders.
Enterprises are demanding for effective and efficient ways
to share and consume IT services and resources across
companies’ boundaries and research on dynamic service
selection and sourcing divulged in industry and academia.
For example, the European Union funded FP7 research
project SPIKE1 addresses exactly those short-term service-
based federations and provides the test bed for the research
presented in this paper.
This new openness to speedily establish virtual partnerships
and the associated rapid and short-term integration of IT
1http://www.spike-project.eu
services with partnering organizations poses intense demands
on organizations’ access control measures [2] and still results
in security being one of the most daunting challenges enter-
prise architects face in cross-organizational SOAs. Access
control at companies’ IT services has to be guaranteed even
if they are supplied rapidly to external parties and the number
and identities of people authorized to access single services
vary frequently and swiftly. The more flexible and rapid
an organization wants source or provide services, the more
effective and powerful its access control schemes must be.
Essential features such as heterogeneous platforms, ubiquitous
accessibility and dynamic workflows that make services and
SOA such an attractive paradigm frequently conflict with
conventional security models and mechanisms [2].
Addressing these challenges, this work proposes a medi-
ating access control infrastructure that helps organizations
to prepare for rapidly sourcing IT services. Authorization
and access control demands are dealt with by the mediated
access control infrastructure that blends well with different
approaches for dynamic service selection and sourcing.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II discusses related work in both relevant fields, dynamic
service selection and service access control. Subsequently,
Section III introduces prevalent design considerations for
our proposal. Section IV details our approach to dynamic
credentials enrichment in detail before Section V provides in-
formation on the prototypical implementation and evaluation
within the SPIKE project. Finally, we draw some conclusions
in the concluding Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
VOs and enterprise networks as dynamic, inter-enterprise
configurations for rapidly sharing IT resources have been
identified as a promising alternative by [1]. Iyer et al. partic-
ularly stressed the issue of a flexible service selection and
sourcing strategy [3]. Dynamic Service Selection addresses
agility and flexibility challenges in those dynamic settings
while service access control is an precondition for putting
dynamic service selection approaches in action.
A. Dynamic Service Selection
Schmidt et al. [4] noticed back in 2005 that "SOA holds
out the promise that services can be discovered [...] and
bound together to form new and exciting, or simply more
efficient applications". They developed the protocol switch
and the service transformation patterns.
Content-based routing (CBR) in ESBs as mentioned by [5]
and others is a rather mature approach. Based on message
contents a component decides to which service instance a
request is forwarded. DRESR [6] by Bai et al. introduces the
idea of abstract routing paths (ARPs), where each service
is identified by an URI and an abstract service name. To
obtain concrete service instances, a central routing manager
component selects a service instance from the pool of
candidates for the given task. Another publication approaches
service selection from the viewpoint of collaboration trust and
reputation [7]. The iWeb framework [8] particulary considers
QoS and other context data for selecting the best available
service. Like our approach it is composed of a 3-layered
architecture for service selection. VRESCo by [9] introduces
an aspect-oriented extension for BPEL environments for
monitoring and replacing partner links.
The concept of Dynamic Composition Handlers (DCHs)
by Chang et al. [10] builds upon an ESB and clearly separates
between service interfaces specified in the process and
realized interfaces. The ESB-based ProBus approach by
Mietzner et al. [11] is a concept for policy-driven dynamic
service selection. In contrast to other work, this approach
mainly focuses on the definition of selection criteria. ProBus
matches the service requester’s policy against resource
properties of known services to obtain a service candidate.
Based on these works we presented an ESB-based approach
that makes use of semantic service descriptions for discovery
and mediation [12], [13].
B. Service Security
While dynamic service selection has frequently been
addressed by researchers, dynamic service access control
in these settings has not yet been considered sufficiently and
only independently from dynamic service selection.
The OASIS published several standards such as WS-
Security , WS-SecurityPolicy , WS-Federation and WS-Trust
to provide general security standards for SOAs. However,
all of them only define how to apply security mechanisms
to individual SOAP messages, rendering their application to
companies interested in opening their business processes
a well-engineered but too low-level technical basis for
unreflected deployment.
Bertino et al. [14] discuss three essential classes of security
services – identity management, authentication and access
control – and propose a service-oriented approach to security.
The service-oriented security architecture presented by [15]
considers the same services and bears a prototype based on
an ESB similar to our approach. The FedWare middleware
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Figure 1. Service Selection and Credentials Enrichment Infrastructure
[16] employs an external Identity Provider (IdP) as we do but
is based on the Sun Java System Identity Manager instead of
open standards. The web service architecture for decentralized
identity- and attribute-based access control by Hebig et al.
[17] considers many of these issues but is particularly tailored
to SOAP services while our approach is open for different
kinds of services due to mediation capabilities of ESBs.
[18] tackles usage and access control in SOAs mainly
from a conceptual perspective, focusing access control models
and policy languages. Still inadequate understanding of the
security issues and potential solutions together with the false
belief that companies have to do costly investments into
security infrastructures impede broad spreading.
III. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS AND DECISIONS
Fig. 1 gives a conceptual overview of our ESB-based
infrastructure for dynamic service selection that builds
the basis for the dynamic credential enrichment approach
laid out in this work. Details on the overal infrastructure
and semantically supported dynamic service selection have
already been illustrated in [12], [13], [19] so that we merely
focus on dynamic security credentials enrichment in this
work. The basic idea is to introduce a layer of indirection
between service requesters and service providers (SPs). This
layer aims at moving the point of time when a concrete
service instance gets selected as close as possible to service
invocation time. Due to this service binding indirection
concrete service instances no longer have to be picked at
modeling or development time of the service client or process
model revealing issues of access control at these dynamically
selected services.
The high-level design goals this concept follows can be
subsumed on an organizational level as follows: (1) Overall,
we aim at enabling rapid formation of short-term collabora-
tive processes and straightforward integration with other
companies’ IT services in a SOA-based manner, i.e. by
means of dynamically selected services and on demand built
service chains. (2) Adaptive access control is a key obstacle
for that aim. Without proper access control procedures in
place that are likewise applicable to intra- and inter-company
scenarios, business relevant services and processes may never
be exposed dynamically to others. Flexible but reliable
cross-organizational access control and identity management
approaches need to be available as an enabling technology.
(3) Aiming for secure company-spanning business processes
it may not be forgotten that IT services and their permanent
and transient availability merely build the breeding ground on
which companies process established businesses transactions
and grab new business opportunities. Thus, any technological
innovation has to merge with companies’ established IT
systems and be applicable to their IT and service landscapes.
On a more technical level further design goals can be
identified: Non-Intrusiveness is one of them the proposed
infrastructure has to meet. Just as the underlying dynamic
service selection approach is transparent to clients and service
providers, the credential enrichment approach has to be
feasible in a minimum-invasive manner to integrate well with
current service landscapes. Likewise it has to be applicable
to various kinds of services and legacy systems in particular
in open, federated and continuously developing environments.
Along with non-intrusiveness comes the demand for one-shot
service selection and invocation. Multi-step approaches that
require several interactions and message exchanges between
service requester and other components before an appropriate
access-restricted service candidate gets selected are not appli-
cable without major adjustments in current service landscapes
and are thus not feasible. Finally, standard compliance marks
an important desing goal. The proposed infrastructure aims at
connecting various previously unacquainted organizations and
in particular their IT systems and services. This goal can only
be reached if the infrastructure complies with and supports
widespread SOA and web service (security) standards.
Approaches for dynamic service selection and binding laid
out in Section II have shown that dynamic service selection
is feasible. The tighter but more flexible and loosely coupled
this integration between previously unacquainted companies
shapes up, the more essential is reliable access control. In
the past it has been easy to distinguish between »good«, i.e.
internal systems, and »bad«, i.e. the Internet, and security has
been enforced at these borders. Nowadays these boundaries
gradually become blurry and vanish, a trend that is notably
pushed by the SOA paradigm.
As a result, we can identify a gap regarding application of
cross-domain security in dynamic service selection settings.
McGraw named this gap a “trinity of trouble” [20] and
further subdivided it into security concerns resulting from
connectivity, extensibility and complexity. Based on this we
draw the following conclusions for this work: (1) Connectivity
means that access-restricted services should still be in the
run as candidate services for dynamic service selection. For
that purpose an authorization and access control concept
is essential that obtains data required for access control
decisions on demand and in the right format. (2) Extensibility
demands that the proposed approach shall be extensible to
different kinds of services, be it modern web services or
legacy services whose access control functions do frequently
not consider modern SOA security standards. (3) Complexity
results from connectivity and extensibility. It increases further
when considering integration among independent companies
for short time, only. Cross-organizational access management
becomes an intrinsic element of the overall complexity.
To address these issues, we opted for implementing the
attribute-based access control (ABAC) model that allows for
expressing all data relevant for an access control decision
in form of attributes and credentials that can easily be
conveyed in form of security tokens. Along with the demand
to span multiple organizations and various service candidates
comes the necessity to dynamically ensure that applicable
credentials are available for SPs to base access control
decisions upon. Supplying required security tokens at the
right time carrying required data in adequate formats is the
main issue this works tackles. User attributes and credentials
build the basis for access control decisions in ABAC systems
which is why freshness of these data is of major importance.
The proposed credential enrichment infrastructure thus has
to provide means to ensure their actuality while data owners
should still be in control for which purpose or service
invocation which of their data are disclosed.
IV. RUN-TIME CREDENTIAL ENRICHMENT
En route dynamic enrichment of access control credentials
builds the basis for flexible service selection and substitution.
Both challenges are not independent but mutual dependent
on one another. In particular minimal invasiveness and ap-
plicability to companies’ current service landscapes demand
for close integration.
A. Overview
The proposed infrastructure aims at dissolving access
control issues coming along with dynamic service selection
and binding. Infrastructure components are positioned in
between service requester and SP to prepare and facilitate
service access control even though particular service instances
get selected on demand. These mediating components in
combination with an extended IdP intercept and extend
service invocations as required by service candidates’ access
control policies. The IdP provides interfaces inspired by the
WS-Trust Security Token Service (STS) to enable the security
broker to retrieve users’ security tokens and credentials as
requested by the dynamically selected service instance and
as disclosed by the particular user.
Fig. 2 illustrates the main actors of the proposed dynamic
service selection and mediated access control infrastructure
and their mutual relations. Users interact with the IdP
(1) and the mediation infrastructure which is split into
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Figure 2. Involved Parties and Interactions
components for (a) dynamic service selection and mediation
and (b) credentials enrichment. Interaction with the service
and security broker occurs unnoticed by the user as the broker
transparently intercepts and processes service invocation
messages. Credentials enrichment components in turn form
the central elements of the overall proposal. They resort to the
service repository (7) for discovery and selection of candidate
services and to internal semantic or static mediation and
transformation facilities for message processing and adaption
[12], [13]. Beyond that, they interact with the IdP (6) to
dynamically fetch user credentials and security tokens in the
format required by the dynamically selected service instance.
Even though the IdP does not interact directly with particular
service candidates and their SP, there still exists an implicit
relation (5) between both: The IdP keeps security tokens
ready based on which SPs decide whether access to their
services is granted or denied. To ease establishing a chain of
trust between users’ IdPs and SPs, trusted third parties might
be employed to verify and certify particular attributes of
users and issue signed tokens, accordingly (2). The relation
between mediation infrastructure and service candidates is
equivalent to the standard service invocation and message
forwarding relation in any scenario that involves an ESB
or other middleware. SPs finally register their services with
a service registry (3) to make them available as service
candidates for dynamic service selection. Beyond that, SPs
optionally rely upon trusted third parties (4) to approve and
certify user data in case they do not have confidence in IdP
for ratifying these data.
B. Dynamic Credential Enrichment Procedure
Based on the overview of involved stakeholders and their
relations in Fig. 2, Fig. 3 illustrates the overall process for
dynamic service selection and credential enrichment as a
whole. Steps marked with a »*« in Fig. 3 are optional.
1) Credential Enrichment: Steps (1) through (5) in Fig. 3
depict preparatory steps. SPs identify in an optional first step
(1) parties whose assertions about users and confirmations
about users’ attributes they rely upon when making an access
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Figure 3. Dynamic Service Selection and Mediated Credential Enrichment
control decision (see relation (4) in Fig. 2). They define
access control policies for their services (step (2) in Fig. 3,
see Section IV-B2 for details) and register their services in
a repository (step (3)). Users prepare for dynamic service
discovery and credentials enrichment by registering with some
IdP. Alternatively, they might make use of their companies’
IdP if available to maintain credentials, security tokens and
other attributes and prepare and disclose partial identities.
Details on user actions are laid out in Section IV-B3. Except
for partial identity definition and authorization (5) which is
potentially carried out for any service invocation, all other
steps are time- and execution-independent.
Step (6) and related sub-steps in Fig. 3 illustrate the
dynamic service discovery and credentials enrichment flow.
Our approach for dynamic service discovery and binding has
already been explained in [12], [13]. First, users (optionally)
prepare a dedicated partial identity and authorize the security
broker to access contained data (step (5)) before they dispatch
a service invocation message toward the virtualized service
interfaces operated by the infrastructure (step (6)). The
invocation message contains a IdP discovery URL and an
access token valid for a particular partial identity (see V-C
for details). The security intermediary gathers all required
data to process and forward the request accordingly. First,
eligible service candidates are located (step (6.1)) and their
respective access control policies are retrieved (step (6.2)
and (6.3)). At the same time the security broker module
discovers data accessible at the user’s IdP (steps (6.4)
and (6.5)) as further detailed in Section V-C. Based on
this information and additional non-functional requirements
for an applicable service instance is selected (step 6.6).
For the particular service instance the security broker then
retrieves required credentials from the user’s IdP (steps
(6.7.x)). Having all relevant data available the service request
message is then transformed and access credentials embedded
accordingly (steps (6.8) and (6.9)) before it is forwarded to
the dynamically selected service instance (step (6.10)). In
step (6.10.1) the SP matches received security tokens and
their payloads against its access policies to make an access
control decision which is then enforced. Finally, the service
result is returned to the user in steps (6.10.3) and (6.13).
Optionally, the SP might issue service-specific credentials
in step (6.10.2). For future access control decisions of the
same user it does then no longer have to elaborately parse and
evaluate various attributes encapsulated in different security
tokens. At mediator side, these newly assigned tokens are
extracted from the service response message (step (6.11)) and
stored to the user’s profile at the IdP (step (6.12)) to make
them available for future invocations of the same service.
2) Service Access Policy Definition: We suppose that SPs
do not resort to pre-established digital identities users assume
to interact with a given service but rather base access control
on various user attributes. We thus follow an ABAC model
which is much more appropriate for dynamic service selection.
Instead of authorizing particular users for their services, SPs
define (alternative) sets of attributes prospective users have
to hold to gain access to a given service. This approach
relieves SPs from maintaining identities of all registered and
authorized users in favor of a more flexible approach. On the
other hand, any user, even previously unacquainted ones, that
holds defined attributes can gain access to a service without
a priori registration with the SP.
We propose to make use of XACML policies to define
access control rules independently of particular service
implementations. XACML policies inherently build upon
attributes so that various types of security tokens can be
expressed. In contrast to WS-SecurityPolicy, a XACML
policy might define access restrictions based on attribute
values conveyed within particular security tokens such as
X.509 or SAML tokens. XACML policies enable the security
broker to discover alternative policy sets that permit access
to a given service (see step (6.2) in Fig. 3).
Please note that the basic principle for this approach to
work is that SPs’ access control policies are made available
publicly. We argue that access control policies are no valuable
assets and therefore not worth protecting. This is the exact
same way WS-SecurityPolicy follows by supplying services’
access policies as part of their WSDL descriptions. Policies
identify credentials or tokens required to gain access to a
service. Even if malicious requesters find out about feasible
attribute sets, they still do not have access to required
attributes issued by the issuer specified in the policy. In
our view, reliability of access control should only depend on
the ownership of predefined credentials and attributes and
not on confidentiality of access policies.
3) Persona Preparation and Disclosure: Users define
attribute sets – also denoted »partial identities« – they are
willing to disclose for a particular server invocation to enable
the security intermediary to obtain users’ security tokens
from their IdPs later on. Partial identities are composed of
any number of attributes, credentials and security tokens a
user holds. Users might define partial identities for different
purposes such as job-related or private use or based on service
types or inquired functionality, might maintain various partial
identities at the same time or construct new ones for each
invocation of novel service types. The IdP supports users
via convenient GUI (see top left in Fig. 5) and returns an
authorization tokens to forward to the intermediary in step
(6) of Fig. 3.
To ensure controlled disclosure of those partial identities
for a specific purpose, i.e. the interaction with a particular
but dynamically selected service instance, our proposed
infrastructure presupposes both users to disclose their data for
a particular service invocation and define access restrictions
for these disclosures of their online profiles. Hence, a user has
to define his disclosure willingness concerning a particular
attribute or sub-sets of his profile.
Privacy and data minimization or avoidance related re-
search developed several approaches for that purpose. Several
languages for privacy policies and privacy preferences such
as P3P Xpref and others exist that allow users to express their
willingness to disclose single attributes or a set of attributes to
third parties. All these approaches primarily focus on privacy
issues, i.e. prevention of data disclosure and processing. They
seek to protect personal user data and strongly rely on the
cooperation of SPs.
The initial point for the proposed dynamic credentials
enrichment approach is different. In contrast to privacy policy
approaches, users’ primary intention here is not to disclose
as few data as possible but instead to access a service
type whose implementing service instance and its access
control restrictions are not known until service invocation
time. For that purpose, users authorize the security broker as
intermediate party to retrieve a subset of the attributes they
hold to gain access to the dynamically selected service. Even
if users do not know in advance which of their attributes will
be retrieved by the security broker to enable access control
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Figure 4. High-Level Architecture
decisions by SPs, they should still be enabled to limit the
scope of available data and ensure that only authorized parties
can gain access to their IdP-managed online identities. For
these reasons, we propose a different approach for attribute
release definition. Instead of users defining universal privacy
policies ex ante, they merely define sets of attributes they
are willing to disclose for a given service request for access
control purposes. Applying this authorization, the security
intermediary retrieves relevant security tokens at runtime.
This approach enables users to easily retrace who retrieved
which information as each attribute retrieval can be recorded
and visualized by the IdP.
C. Summary
The overall dynamic credentials enrichment process de-
mands for tight integration of both integral parts of the
proposed infrastructure, service selection and mediation
components on the one hand and mediated access control
modules on the other hand. Fig. 4 illustrates the resulting
high-level architecture. The ESB-based broker provides a
transparent messaging infrastructure that interacts with users’
IdPs to retrieve relevant security tokens. Users interact
with their IdPs via a convenient GUI to define disclosed
attribute sets and authorizations. SPs operate their services,
define suitable access policies and implement access control
measures to enforce these policies.
V. PROTOTYPE AND EVALUATION
Details on dynamic service selection ((A) and (B) in Fig.
5) have already been published in [12], [13] so that we only
consider run-time credentials enrichment here. As can be seen
in Figs. 4 and 5 we built our approach in conformance with
the XACML and ISO10181-3 standards regarding separation
and distribution of individual security components within the
architecture. The client represents the access requester or
initiator while the service instance represents the target or
resource. The IdP conforms to the functions of the policy
information point (PIP). The policy enforcement point (PEP)
or access control enforcement function (AEF) is provided
by the service instance inbound security module just as the
policy decision point (PDP)/access control decision function
(ADF). Finally, the policy administration point (PAP) does
not exist as a single component but, following the idea of
the WS-Security standards, rather each service instance is
capable of providing its security policy in a machine-readable
form as part of its interface description. Exemplary request-
/response messages as well as interface descriptions of our
STS service and discovery documents are available2
A. ESB-based Transparent Intermediary
Fig. 5 gives an overview of the ESB-based infrastruc-
ture prototype for dynamic service selection an credentials
enrichment. Apache ServiceMix ESB provides the runtime
environment into which several components are deployed
to implement required functionality for dynamic service
selection and mediation [13]. The underlying JBI standard3
ensures reasonable and standardized extension points in
form of BCs and SEs to implement new functionality for
message processing, transformation and enrichment. Relevant
functionality for dynamic credential enrichment has been
implemented as custom functionality in form of ServiceMix-
Bean SEs ((3) and (8) in Fig. 5). These components interact
with users’ IdPs to retrieve relevant security tokens at runtime.
(3) ensures that only those services are considered for dynamic
selection that do not demand for more or different security
tokens and attributes than the user disclosed for the current
invocation (see (6.2) to (6.5) in Fig. 3). (8) then retrieves
relevant security tokens from the IdP as soon as a concrete
service instance has been selected (consistent with (6.7.x)
and (6.9) in Fig. 3). Data on the user’s IdP and an access
token to its STS interfaces are extracted from the incoming
message. This information is then used to obtain information
on security tokens and attributes accessible at the IdP before
2http://www-ifsresearch.wiwi.uni-regensburg.de/ICEBE/icebe.zip
3http://www.jcp.org/en/jsr/detail?id=208
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Figure 5. Prototype Overview
authorization data required by a particular service candidate
are requested via the IdP’s STS interface. Finally, these data
are embedded into the service request message.
Thus the ESB-based infrastructure is transparent to client
and service. Clients issue service requests to the infrastruc-
ture’s virtualized interfaces (2) and services receive proper
invocation messages that contain relevant security tokens
from the infrastructure’s outgoing BC (9).
B. IdP\STS Interfaces
The IdP forms the user-targeted counterpart of the security
intermediary. The prototype comprises two complementary
interfaces: (1) A user-facing GUI to let users define sets of at-
tributes they are willing to disclose, configure access to these
personas and manage authorized requesters. (2) RESTful
STS service endpoints that enable the credential enrichment
services to interact with the IdP to retrieve users’ security
tokens and attributes in various formats and representations.
To retrieve security tokens we make use of WS-Trust
<wst:RequestSecurityToken> messages. In contrast
to standard messages we embed a SAML Attribute-
Query in its SecondaryParameters to let the security
broker define in detail what attributes should be enclosed
in the requested security token. An exemplary query that
returns a SAML security token containing the user’s eMail
address, name and identifier (lines 12–14) as SAML token
(line 2) is shown in Listing 1. To specify requested attributes
uniformly, our prototype makes use of identifiers specified in
the OASIS Identity Metasystem Interoperability, X.500(96)
User Schema for use with LDAPv3, the inetOrgPerson LDAP
Object Class and axschema.org.
1 <wst:RequestSecurityToken xmlns:wst="...">
2 ..
3 <wst:SecondaryParameters>
4 <saml2p:AttributeQuery>
5 <saml2:Attribute Name="http://axschema.org/company/name">
6 <saml2:Attribute Name="http://axschema.org/contact/email">
7 <saml2:Attribute Name="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/05/
identity/claims/privatepersonalidentifier">
8 </saml2p:AttributeQuery>
9 </wst:SecondaryParameters>
10 ..
Listing 1. Exemplary SAML Attribute Query
The IdP REST endpoints are implemented with the Jersey
framework based on the JAX-RS specification. OAuth-based
access control at these REST endpoints is realized by means
of the Jersey-OAuth extension4 and another open-source
OAuth library for Java5. Query processing and issuing of
SAML tokens is implemented with the OpenSAML6 library
while X.509 attribute certificates are constructed with the
help of the Bouncy Castle library.
C. IdP and Credentials Discovery
Our proposal allows each user to maintain its secu-
rity tokens and attributes at a different IdP which is
why various IdPs may exist. Thus, the security interme-
diary has to be able to discover users’ IdPs and their
REST endpoints. IdP discovery is implemented in our
prototype via the Yadis protocol which in turn makes
use of XRDS capabilities documents. The provided sam-
ple XRDS document defines endpoints required by the
OAuth-based access control scheme and describes the IdP’s
STS and auxiliary interfaces. The URI given for the
»oauth.net/core/1.0/endpoint/resource« ser-
vice type denotes the actual STS endpoint URL where the
security intermediary may retrieve security tokens and at-
tributes in various formats. Other URLs specify the endpoints
for retrieving attribute identifiers and security token formats
supported by this IdP and a list of attributes accessible to the
security intermediary under the current access credentials.
4http://java.net/projects/jersey/sources/svn/show/tags/jersey-
1.5/jersey/contribs/jersey-oauth
5http://oauth.googlecode.com/svn/code/java
6http://www.shibboleth.net/downloads/java-opensaml/
Users convey a discovery URL pointing to a XRDS
discovery document (see provided example) to the security
intermediary within service request messages ((6) in Fig. 3)
from which the intermediary can learn all relevant data.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented a mediated access control
infrastructure that makes dynamic replacement of access
restricted services possible. Transparent infrastructure com-
ponents retrieve and attach security tokens required for access
control at dynamically selected services instances. An identity
provider enables users to define bundles of attributes and
credentials and disclose them for particular purposes and
service invocations. Via its access restricted REST interfaces
it enables the security intermediary to retrieve users’ data
as requested and in the format required by the particular
dynamically selected service instance.
The overall infrastructure has been prototyped and tested
in the European FP7 research project SPIKE. Results show
that the presented approach brings forward dynamic service
selection even in those settings where service access control
is of importance. As the overall concept is built around
and extends well-known standards it can rather easily been
implemented in current service landscapes.
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